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Abstract
This paper addresses the question of whether sovereign risk pricing was related to 
macroeconomic fundamentals, between 2007 and 2015, in a sample of OECD coun-
tries. The authors argue that the conflicting evidence in the literature is due to poor 
methodology options. The researchers innovate by modelling sovereign credit default 
swaps implied ratings as our sovereign risk proxy, instead of spreads, avoiding com-
mon pitfalls. Furthermore, the authors improve the variable selection, model specifica-
tion and the econometric procedures used. A panel ordered probit model is chosen, 
assuring robust inference. The authors relax the parallel lines assumption, allowing 
for rating-varying coefficients of explanatory variables. The result is the first congru-
ent model of sovereign risk during the years of the financial crisis and of the Euro 
Area crisis. Fiscal space variables, economic activity indicators, variables pertaining to 
external imbalances, and contagion proxies are relevant, with effects matching theory 
priors. The scientists clarify conundrums in the previous literature, posed by lack of 
significance of some macro fundamentals and by puzzling signs of some estimated co-
efficients. Moreover, this is the first paper to estimate not only the global risk premium, 
but also the impact of changing risk aversion. The authors find no support for claims 
of sovereign risk mispricing during the sample period. The results allow relevant policy 
conclusions, namely concerning the validity of different fiscal consolidation paths in 
financially distressed countries.
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INTRODUCTION
Understanding the f luctuations of credit risk is of the utmost rel-
evance both for policy-makers and for investment managers, par-
ticularly since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007. The Euro 
Area (EA) debt crisis has further increased this relevance. If ear-
lier academic research on credit risk mispricing was focused on US 
corporate bonds, and on sovereign credit default swaps (SCDSs) 
for emerging economies, Heynderickx et al. (2016) argue the EA is 
now at the core of the credit spreads puzzle. Feldhüter and Schaefer 
(2018) restrict the dimension of the puzzle to sovereign securi-
ties. As pointed out, inter alia, by Bannier et al. (2014), the surge of 
SCDSs in recent years is mainly due to the European debt crisis. In 
this journal, Oliveira and Santos (2015) have extensively discussed 
these OTC derivatives, while providing evidence of the vast related 
research propelled by the EA crisis.
The relevance of this topic for policy-makers is easy to understand. 
During the EA crisis, f luctuations in sovereign risk premia account 
for 30 to 50% of the forecast errors in unemployment, and for 20 to 
40% of the increase in private borrowing costs (Bahaj, 2014). The 
transmission mechanism from SCDSs spreads to the real economy 
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rests on their leading role on the price discovery process in bond markets (Delatte et al., 2012), and 
on the upper bounds sovereign ratings still pose on corporate ratings (Borensztein et al., 2013)1. 
Policy-makers are aware of the role of country ratings in financial stability (Klinger & Lando, 2018), 
since the linkage between sovereign and banking risk is well documented (Bruneau et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, access to the ECB Asset Purchasing Program is contingent on the existence of at least 
one major rating agency grading such debt securities above a minimum threshold2.
From the perspective of an investments manager, the ability to assess credit risk is also of para-
mount importance, since portfolios usually contain corporate and / or sovereign bonds. A correct 
hedging strategy entails assessing the likelihood of default, namely to decide the amount of pro-
tection to buy in the form of Credit Default Swaps (CDSs). Moreover, if the investment manager 
wishes to buy CDSs for trading, the ability to anticipate changes in spreads allows significant profit 
opportunities3. 
Irrespective of whether the motivation is policy design or building trading and hedging strate-
gies, understanding the relationship between sovereign risk and economic fundamentals has be-
come a part of the research agenda in finance. Notwithstanding, the literature is far from reaching 
sound conclusions. As we shall debate in section 1, this is largely due to poor methodology options. 
Afonso et al. (2007) had argued that modelling sovereign spreads is difficult, advising the usage of 
ratings as latent dependent variables in ordered probit models. A panel approach was also strongly 
recommended to increase the robustness of statistical inference. However, the empirical literature 
has neglected proxies for sovereign risk other than spreads and has paid no attention to the authors’ 
recommendation on econometric methods.
The research question motivating this paper is whether there is a role for economic fundamentals 
in sovereign risk pricing. We improve on the literature in different ways. Firstly, this is the first 
paper to use SCDSs implied ratings, constructed using spread implied credit default probabilities 
(CDPs)4 as a proxy of sovereign risk. Secondly, we use a panel ordered probit model, as recom-
mended by Afonso et al. (2007). Thirdly, we explore the implications of relaxing the parallel lines 
assumption, which had never been discussed in this literature. As such, instead of simply includ-
ing time-varying coefficients, we also allow rating-varying coefficients. We do not assume that 
different crisis stages have similar cross-sectional impacts on sovereign risk, irrespective of each 
country’s rating at the time. Rather, the no parallel lines hypothesis allows to assess the impact of 
different crisis periods per rating class. We also innovate by including in our model a proxy for 
time-varying risk aversion. Our estimation results improve on the literature: the first congruent 
model relating macro-financial variables to sovereign risk is achieved. We have tested the inclusion 
of proxies for all the relevant dimensions suggested in earlier papers. They proved to be significant 
and their estimated impact on sovereign risk matches theory priors. Thus, previous empirical co-
nundrums were solved. Finally, this paper also innovates by exploring a novel data set on SCDSs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides a critical overview of the relevant literature. 
Section 2 explains our methodology. Section 3 discusses the research hypotheses. Section 4 de-
scribes the data. Section 5 discusses estimation results. Final section concludes the paper.
1 Although rating agencies claim to have moved away from the “sovereign ceilings” policy, evidence shows that sovereign ratings are still a 
major determinant of corporate ratings (Borensztein et al., 2013). 
2 his is of special concern in the financially distressed EA periphery (De Santis, 2016). In the Portuguese case, until early 2017, financial 
stability was dependent on the Canadian rating agency DBRS, the only one classifying the country’s sovereign debt just above “speculative 
grade” (as BBB).
3 Oliveira and Santos (2015) discuss profitable trading strategies for investors holding SCDSs.
4 Research on CDPs and implied ratings has been conducted in Finance, but not with respect to the macroeconomic determinants of 
sovereign risk. For details on filtering CDPs from CDSs spreads see, inter alia, Elkamhi et al. (2014).
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1. LITERATURE REVIEW
The conclusions emerging from the empirical lit-
erature on sovereign risk and fundamentals are 
largely contradictory. Indeed, not only do can-
didate explanatory variables vary across papers, 
but also even papers including similar covariates 
reach opposite conclusions regarding their signifi-
cance and impact. Furthermore, poor choices of 
the proxy for sovereign risk are common. Finally, 
the econometric methods chosen are misleading. 
We will divide our critical overview of the litera-
ture in 3 subsections, each pertaining to one of the 
referred problems.
1.1. Candidate covariates
It is possible to arrange the variables assessed in 
the literature into five main groups: fiscal space; 
external imbalances; risk and contagion; econom-
ic activity; less common covariates.
1.1.1. Fiscal space
The literature has used several fiscal space indi-
cators. Indeed, from the most relevant empirical 
studies, only Boffelli et al. (2017) and Arghyrou 
and Kontonikas (2012) neglect this dimension. 
The ratio of public debt to GDP is used in Caceres 
et al. (2010), Santos (2011), Beirne and Fratzscher 
(2013), and Afonso et al. (2015). Paniagua et al. 
(2017) use the difference between this ratio, for 
each country, and its value for Germany. The gov-
ernment balance to GDP ratio is used in Caceres 
et al. (2010), Beirne and Fratzscher (2013), Afonso 
et al. (2015), Yuan and Pongsiri (2015), and Kriz et 
al. (2015). Yuan and Pongsiri (2015) also include 
a measure of the expected government balance to 
GDP ratio. Aizenman et al. (2013) use the ratios 
of public debt and of the government budget bal-
ance to total taxes. The ratio of total government 
revenue to GDP is included in Oliveira et al. (2012) 
and in Kriz et al. (2015). Oliveira et al. (2012) also 
include subclasses of government expenditure. 
Fiscal space variables are significant in Caceres et 
al. (2010), Aizenman et al. (2013), Kriz et al. (2015) 
and Paniagua et al. (2017). Santos (2011) has con-
cluded that the public debt to GDP ratio was on-
ly significant for the top 10% of the CDPs distri-
bution. Oliveira et al. (2012) find their classes of 
government expenditure to be relevant, but only 
before the EA crisis. Differently, the taxes to GDP 
ratio is relevant throughout their entire sample 
period. Afonso et al. (2015) conclude against the 
significance of the public debt to GDP ratio. This 
is unexpected, since their sample contains only 
the EA countries. Notwithstanding, the authors 
find the government balance to be relevant. Beirne 
and Fratzscher (2013) achieve even more puzzling 
results: the public debt to GDP ratio is always ir-
relevant for EA countries, and the government 
balance ratio matters only before the crisis period. 
Yuan and Pongsiri (2015) conclude that the gov-
ernment balance is irrelevant, although the ex-
pected government balance is significant. The au-
thors acknowledge that multicollinearity is affect-
ing their results.
1.1.2. External imbalances 
Cantor and Packer’s (1996) seminal work provides 
the expectation of a positive correlation between 
a country’s current account balance and its sov-
ereign spreads. However, Beirne and Fratzscher 
(2013) find that the current account to GDP ratio 
is not significant for the EA countries during their 
sample period, although it is relevant for other 
advanced economies. Furthermore, Aizenman et 
al. (2013) conclude that the external debt to GDP 
ratio is not significant. Albeit concluding against 
the relevance of the current account, Yuan and 
Pongsiri (2015) find that the ratio of external debt 
to GDP increases sovereign spreads. Oliveira et 
al. (2012), Santos (2011) and Kriz et al. (2015) also 
find the external debt ratio to be significant.
When taking the space of external imbalances 
to be represented by other variables, results are 
also ambiguous. Aizenman et al. (2013) conclude 
against the relevance of trade openness. Arghyrou 
and Kontonikas (2012) find that country’s com-
petitiveness (proxied by the logarithm of the real 
weighted exchange rate) is relevant in explaining 
sovereign risk. Neither Afonso et al. (2015) nor 
Yuan and Pongsiri (2015) find the exchange rates 
to be relevant. 
Boffelli et al. (2017), Caceres et al. (2010) and 
Paniagua et al. (2017) do not assess the role of ex-
ternal imbalances.
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1.1.3. Risk and contagion
The VIX index5 is the standard proxy for global 
risk in this literature. It is significant in explain-
ing country-specific sovereign risk in Paniagua 
et al. (2017) and Afonso et al. (2015). However, 
Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) do not find a 
role for global risk in their first sample period 
(2001–2007). The authors claim that relevance of 
global risk occurs during the financial crisis alone. 
Surprisingly, during the EA crisis, they don’t find 
the VIX to be significant.
Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) use the first differ-
ence of the VIX as a proxy of global risk6. They 
reach the unexpected conclusion that an increase 
in global risk decreases the EA sovereign spreads. 
For emerging economies, they find the expected 
positive impact. Kriz et al. (2015) use year-specific 
dummies as proxies for global risk. These are sig-
nificant, and the estimated coefficients are posi-
tive, as expected. Differently, Caceres et al. (2010) 
use the Index of Global Risk Aversion (IGRA). 
They find the IGRA to be significant and positively 
correlated with sovereign risk, with the surprising 
exception of the EA periphery. 
The possible relevance of global risk is not ac-
counted for in Santos (2011), Oliveira et al. (2012), 
Yuan and Pongsiri (2015) and Boffelli et al. (2017).
Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) use regional dum-
mies to test for shift-contagion, concluding in fa-
vor of that hypothesis. Caceres et al. (2010) had 
also found evidence of contagion within the EA 
periphery. 
1.1.4. Economic activity
The real growth rate of GDP is relevant in the 
models of Kriz et al. (2015) and Yuan and Pongsiri 
(2015). Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) find that, for 
the EA periphery, real GDP growth does not ex-
plain sovereign risk. Adding to the authors’ sur-
prise, they find that, for other advanced economies, 
increases in real GDP growth are estimated to sig-
nificantly increase sovereign spreads. Arghyrou 
and Kontonikas (2012) use output growth differ-
5 Obtained using call and put implied volatilities from the S&P 500 index.
6 In section 4, we shall provide a different interpretation for this difference. 
entials between countries as a proxy for the space 
of growth related variables, but only in single 
equation models (not in their panel setting). They 
conclude that the variable is significant in only 
one of the sample countries.
The growth rate of industrial production has been 
used by Oliveira et al. (2012). A negative relation-
ship between industrial production and sovereign 
spreads is found, although only for the period be-
fore the EA crisis. The differential between each 
country’s industrial production growth and the 
German one is significant in Boffelli et al. (2017), 
but not retained in the final congruent model of 
Afonso et al. (2015). Other papers referred to in 
this section neglect the possible relevance of real 
growth.
Paniagua et al. (2017) and Boffelli et al. (2017) have 
concluded that the unemployment rate matters for 
sovereign risk. However, Kriz et al. (2015) did not 
find it to be significant. No other study has tested 
the inclusion of this variable.
The role of inflation has been controversial, since 
the seminal work of Cantor and Packer (1996). 
Aizenman et al. (2013), Oliveira et al. (2012) and 
Yuan and Pongsiri (2015) found inflation to be ir-
relevant. Differently, Kriz et al. (2015) found the 
variable to be significant. Notwithstanding, the 
authors do not clarify whether they are referring 
to inflation or to changes in inflation. None of the 
other papers has discussed the relevance of infla-
tion in sovereign risk models.
1.1.5. Other variables
Yuan and Pongsiri (2015) test the relevance of ex-
pectations concerning GDP growth, but fail to 
reach a conclusion. Differently, Boffelli et al. (2017) 
conclude that expectations, measured by the dif-
ference between each country’s Eurostat index of 
business confidence and the corresponding value 
for Germany, are relevant in explaining sovereign 
risk. However, this is likely to be capturing the ef-
fect of correlated omitted variables, given the au-
thors’ extremely parsimonious representation of 
macroeconomic fundamentals. Liquidity of the 
5
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sovereign bonds market is assessed in Afonso et al. 
(2015) and Paniagua et al. (2017). Both conclude 
against its relevance, except for some countries 
in the EA periphery. Notwithstanding, Arghyrou 
and Kontonikas (2012) found bond markets liquid-
ity to be relevant, but with an unexpected positive 
estimated coefficient, implying lower spreads for 
less liquid markets.
1.2. Explained variable
The most common sovereign risk proxy is the 
spread between the interest rate on a country’s 
government bonds and that on bonds of some 
other reference country for the same maturity. In 
the recent literature, the reference is usually the 10 
years maturity German bonds. This is the case in 
Paniagua et al. (2017), Arghyrou and Kontonikas 
(2012), Oliveira et al. (2012), Afonso et al. (2015) 
and Boffelli et al. (2017). Caceres et al. (2010) use 
the spread of a 10 years maturity EuroSwap. Beirne 
and Fratzscher (2013) use the spread between gov-
ernment bonds and 3 months money market rates.
Notwithstanding, it is widely acknowledged that 
SCDSs spreads provide a better proxy of sover-
eign risk (e.g. Delatte et al., 2012). Paniagua et al. 
(2017) explain they would rather have used SCDSs 
spreads, but failed to obtain data prior to 2007. 
Albeit using bond spreads, Beirne and Fratzscher 
(2013) conduct robustness tests, checking their 
conclusions with SCDSs spreads. Aizenman et al. 
(2013) and Yuan and Pongsiri (2015) use SCDSs 
spreads as their dependent variable.
Different sovereign risk proxies, derived from 
SCDSs, are used in Kriz et al. (2015) and Santos 
(2011). The former used a panel of CDPs, for a 
sample of 57 countries, referring to the period be-
tween 2009 and 2013. The latter uses CDPs’ im-
plied ratings in a cross-sectional sample. 
1.3. Econometric methods
Dynamic panel models, occasionally including 
time-varying parameters, are the most common-
ly used when the dependent variable is a spread. 
This is the case in Aizenman et al. (2013), Beirne 
and Fratzscher (2013), Arghyrou and Kontonikas 
(2012), Oliveira et al. (2012), and Yuan and 
Pongsiri (2015). Paniagua et al. (2017) use a dy-
namic panel setting allowing for time-varying 
parameters, and for random coefficients (with 
cyclical asymmetries between countries as the 
source of randomness).
Afonso et al. (2015) use a cross-sectional model in-
stead of a panel approach to assess the results of the 
general-to-specific model selection embodied in 
autometrics (Doornik, 2009). Differently, Caceres 
et al. (2010) modelled the spread with a GARCH. 
Boffelli et al. (2017) have extended the Mixed Data 
Sampling (MIDAS) approach to combine high fre-
quency financial information with lower frequen-
cy variables. However, the restriction to monthly 
macro variables leads to a poor picture of the role 
of fundamentals in their analysis. 
The conflicting results referred to in subsection 1.1 
are likely an outcome of the difficulty in model-
ling sovereign spreads, which had been outlined 
by Afonso et al. (2007). Statistical inference with 
such a dependent variable is often invalid. The 
possibility of explosive roots in spreads is one of 
the reasons for this (e.g. Oliveira & Santos, 2015). 
Surrogate proxies for sovereign risk should be 
favored.
Kriz et al. (2015) have used a panel specification 
to relate sovereign CDPs to fundamentals. Given 
the flawed results of their preliminary linear prob-
ability models, the authors chose a log-normal dis-
tribution for the random error. Notwithstanding, 
they should have assessed standard panel probits 
and logits. Indeed, even their log-normal model 
has led to dubious inference conclusions, given 
the censored and clustered nature of CDPs da-
ta. Flannery and Hankins (2013) had extensively 
discussed the econometrics of panel data when 
the dependent variable is censored and clus-
tered, suggesting the best estimation procedures 
for such cases. Kriz et al. (2015) neglected those 
recommendations. 
Santos (2011) built a cross-sectional ordered 
probit model of implied SCDSs ratings. Afonso 
et al. (2007) had clarified that ordinal models 
should be used in panel settings for robust in-
ference on ratings, given their asymptotic prop-
erties. Hence, insufficient data for a panel or-
dered probit sheds doubts over the conclusions 
in Santos (2011). 
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2. ANALYSIS  
METHODS
Credit ratings provide a natural field of appli-
cation for ordered probit models (e.g. Cantor & 
Packer, 1996). The nature of ratings data fits in 
a framework where the difference between the 
ordinal scores of, say, 4 and 3, is not equivalent 
to the difference between the cardinals 4 and 
3. For the latter, multinomial probits and log-
its are better suited. Differently, albeit being as-
sociated with differences in credit worthiness, 
variations in rating scores are not quantitatively 
equal to those.
In Corporate Finance, selection bias is com-
mon, when modelling ratings with ordered pro-
bits. This is attributed to privileged informa-
tion managers possess about their firms. When 
choosing to solicit ratings, managers anticipate 
good scores. Hence, firms receiving unsolicited 
ratings are likely to be subject to downward bi-
ased rating estimators (e.g. Poon, 2003).
The methodology framework in which this pa-
per studies sovereign risk avoids the selection 
bias problem, as data provided by rating agen-
cies is avoided. Instead, ratings are derived from 
market information (SCDSs spreads and their 
implied CDPs). This is the case for every coun-
try in the sample in every period. Self-selection 
is prevented, since the decision to trade SCDSs 
on a country’s debt depends on market par-
ticipants alone, without interference from the 
country’s government. All SCDSs implied rat-
ings may be viewed as “unsolicited”.
The structure of an ordered probit contemplates 
S ordered classes. Let 
*
,i tR  be the latent or unob-
served credit risk of country ,i  at time .t  Let 
,i tR  be the rating computed from the country’s 
SCDSs spread at time t, for a certain maturity. It 
is generally assumed that:
*
, , * , ,i t i t i tR x β µ ε= + +  (1)
*
,i tR  and the observed market implied rating, ,i tR  
are related by:





































<= < ≤ 
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 
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,i tx  is a vector of explanatory variables, and *β  s 
the vector of coefficients. As expected for a panel 
data setting, equation (1) contemplates two ran-
dom errors: iµ  and , .i tε  At the estimation level, 
we shall cope with this through the assumption 
that they are both normally distributed. Hence, 
we shall work with the Random Effects ordered 
probit model, using Maximum Likelihood (ML) 
estimation (see, inter alia, Frechette (2001) for 
implementation in STATA). Furthermore, we 
allow the coefficients to vary according to a 
country’s risk class. This option is known as re-
laxing the parallel lines assumption in ordered 
probit theory (Williams, 2006, 2016; Pfarr et al., 
2011). The intuition for the possibility of rat-
ing-varying coefficients results from an obser-
vation in Afonso et al. (2007), emerging from 
subsample analysis, where some variables had 
a different impact for countries with different 
ratings. Neither Afonso et al. (2007) nor subse-
quent authors have pursued this research. Thus, 
we innovate by checking thoroughly if the effect 
of each variable has a random component, de-
pending on the rating order7. iα  are the cut-off 
unknown parameters, which are also estimated 
through ML.
The probability that the market assigned the rat-
ing ,js  1,2,...,j S=  to country ,i  in period ,t  is:
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( )wΦ denotes, as usual, the cumulative distribu-
tion for a multivariate normal evaluated at some 
vector .w  We choose to assign 1 to the best rating 
class and S to the worst. A rating order increase 
implies a higher sovereign CDP. Furthermore,
, *i tx β  is
, * , ,1 1
, , ,1 1
,
T K
i t t t l l i tt l
K S













K  is the total number of macroeconomic and 
financial covariates included in the model. Each 
might have a global effect on 
*
,i tR  and an effect 
contingent on the credit rating of each country, at 
each moment in time, 
, , , .j l j l i tDrat xδ  jDrat  is an 
indicator variable, taking the value 1 if the coun-
try’s rating is 2,j ≥  and 0 otherwise. Although 
autofit (see footnote 7) tests the possibility of dif-
ferent coefficients for each variable and rating 
class, only the statistically relevant cross-product 
dummies are retained in the final model (in a sim-
ilar approach to reducing the model by checking 
congruency at each stage, embodied in general-to-
specific model selection (Doornik, 2009). Notice 
further that, in equation (4) ,S S′ ≤  since the 
number of rating classes acceptable for efficient es-
timation may need to be reduced, when consider-
ing the subset of rating-varying coefficients, in the 
no parallel lines setting. It is usual that ,S S′ <  as 
discussed in Pfarr et al. (2011). Finally, time spe-
cific dummies and the candidate macro covariates 
are subject to the same congruency and signifi-
cance criteria for inclusion in the final model (for 
a detailed discussion of congruency and congru-
ent models, see Bärdsen et al., 2005). 
A note should be made on the construction of 
rating classes. Following the advice in the litera-
ture8, we were concerned that an excess number 
of rating classes might result in imprecise pa-
8 Cantor and Packer (1996) observe that a bigger number of classes combined with few to none rating observations in some, would induce 
failures of the ML estimates to converge. Afonso et al. (2007) also discuss the need to reduce the number of rating classes to increase 
estimation precision.
rameter estimates, as some classes would have 
very few observations. This would also occur if 
CDP intervals, associated with very high CDPs, 
had small lengths. As such, we have divided the 
observed CDPs in 8 classes: [0%-5%]; [5%-10%]; 
[10%-15%]; [15%-20%]; [20%-30%]; [30%-40%]; 
[40%-50%]; [50%-100%]. The associated orders 
are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, respectively, repre-
senting the rating levels. We use the same map-
ping strategy as in Afonso et al. (2007). Adding 
to this, as discussed in the previous paragraph, 
we assume S’< S. The number of classes consid-
ered for efficient estimation of the cross-prod-
uct dummies’ coefficients is only 5.S ′ =  The 
first 4 are equivalent to the above, with the 5th 
being [20%-100%]. The reduction to these 5 
classes, when estimating the 
jδ  parameters, is 
supported by the 95% ML confidence interval 
estimates for cut-off CDPs. Results for ˆlα  are 
presented in the Appendix (Table A1). For the 
first 5 classes, the lower cut-off is included in 
the estimated interval. However, for the oth-
ers, intervals nearly overlap. This is due to few 
observations for very high CDPs. Hence, it sup-
ports our choice to estimate the subset of rating-
varying coefficients with 5 .S S′ = ≠
3. HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT
Our research question pertains to the possibility 
of building a congruent model of sovereign risk 
based on macro fundamentals. The empirical evi-
dence discussed in subsection 1.1 suggests 14 re-
search hypotheses. The first 12 refer to the possible 
relevance of specific variables in explaining sover-
eign risk, the 13th hypothesis refers to time-specific 
effects, and the 14th to regional contagion: 
H1: Higher real GDP growth improves sovereign 
ratings.
H2: Higher public debt to GDP ratios worsen sov-
ereign ratings.
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H4: Higher external debt to GDP ratios worsen 
sovereign ratings.
H5: Higher government deficit to GDP ratios 
worsen sovereign ratings.
H6: Higher inflation worsens sovereign ratings.
H7: Changes in inflation affect sovereign ratings.
H8: Higher global risk worsens sovereign ratings.
H9: Changes in risk aversion affect sovereign 
ratings.
H10: Higher unemployment worsens sovereign 
ratings.
H11: The current account balance to GDP ratio af-
fects sovereign ratings.
H12: Changes in the current account balance to 
GDP ratio affect sovereign ratings.
H13: Year-specific events affect Sovereign ratings.
H14: There are regional specific effects in the EA 
periphery.
4. DATA
Our panel is strongly balanced. It comprises the 
periods between the final quarter of 2007 and the 
1st quarter of 2015 (T = 30 quarters), and 26 OECD 
countries (N = 26)9. Hence, the analysis was con-
ducted with 780 observations per variable. As ex-
plained in section 2, the rating classes were derived 
from CDPs. We have built a unique data set for this 
purpose. From 2007 to 2013, CDPs were collected 
from Credit Market Limited (CMA) Datavision® 
quarterly sovereign risk reports. Given that these 
became unavailable, with the necessary level of 
detail, from 2013 onwards, we have used, for the 
subsequent periods, CDPs computed similarly 
by Markit®10. To ensure consistency with CMA 
9 10 of the original EA countries (except for Finland), Australia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, South Korea, 
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovak Republik, Slovenia, Sweden, UK and US.
10 For detailed information on Markit ® data see, in this journal, Oliveira and Santos (2015). 
11 It should be noticed that, in our sample, the mean of ΔX8 is negative, further supporting the need to estimate the impact of a changing 
risk aversion on sovereign ratings (as shall be done in section 5). 
Datavision® data, we have chosen end of quarter 
Markit® CDPs, for each relevant period. 
With respect to the macro-financial covariates, we 
have collected data for all the dimensions referred 
to in subsection 1.1. Hence, we define the following 
variables:
• Fiscal Space: government revenue to GDP 
(X
5
); government balance to GDP ( )6 ;X  pub-
lic debt to GDP ( )3 ;X
• External Imbalances: external debt to GDP 
(X
4
); current account to GDP (X
10
); changes in 
the current account to GDP ( )10 ;X∆  
• Risk and Contagion: VIX index ( )8 ;X  chang-
es in the risk proxy C ( )8 ;X∆  ,GIPSID  tak-
ing the value 1 for observations from Greece, 
Portugal, Italy, Spain and Ireland;
• Economic Activity: GDP real growth rate ( )2 ;X  
Consumer Price Index Inflation ( )7 ;X  inflation 
changes ( )7 ;X∆  unemployment rate ( )9 ;X
• Year-Specific Indicators: 09D  for 2009; 10D  
for 2010; 11D  for 2011; 12D  for 2012; 13D  for 
2013; 14D  for 2014; 15D  for 2015;
• Cross-Product Indicators: 
, , ,j l i tDrat x  as ex-
plained in section 2. 
It should be noticed that Beirne and Fratzscher 
(2013) use the change in the VIX as a proxy for 
global risk, while we use the VIX index for that. 
Hence, 8X∆  has a different role in our model: it is 
a proxy for global risk aversion. Our hypothesis of 
a time-varying risk aversion is in accordance with 
the behavior anticipated in expected utility the-
ory, in Financial Economics, matching preposi-
tion 6.C.4 in Mas-Colell et al. (1995). Furthermore, 
Heinz and Sun (2014) had provided empirical evi-
dence of non-constant risk aversion, following the 
financial crisis11. Ours is the first model in this lit-
erature to include both risk and risk aversion as 
covariates explaining sovereign risk. 
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All macroeconomic and financial variables were 
obtained from DataStream, except for 3X  and 
4X   (retrieved from OECD statistics)
12.
Despite the discussion in subsection 1.1.5, no proxy 
for liquidity is included in our model, since we are 
working with SCDSs instead of bonds. For the lat-
ter, meaningful liquidity measures are easy to ob-
tain. For the former, the opacity of OTC derivatives 
renders any liquidity proxy imprecise (e.g. Markit ® 
does not have bid-ask spreads neither for all sover-
eign entities, nor for the entire sample period). 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 1 reports the estimation results. The 1st col-
umn lists the explanatory variables, the 2nd the 
12 Given the lack of availability of data, for some covariates, at a quarterly frequency, we follow the literature consensus, using standard 
interpolation (e.g. Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013).
13 ΔX7i,t is maintained in order to draw a conclusion regarding H7.
coefficients’ estimates, and the 3rd the t-ratios. 
Non-significant year-specific indicators, macro-
financial covariates and cross-product dummies 
were omitted from the final model13, as outlined 
in section 2. The likelihood ratio test for global 
significance rejects the null hypothesis (at 0.1%): 
LR
obs
 = –315.96357. Furthermore, the test of a 
pooled ordered probit against a panel model re-
jects the hypothesis of no gains from using a panel 
at 0.1% (LR
obs
 = –166.63). Thus, congruency of our 
model is assured.
Results in Table 1 translate to relevant improve-
ments over the previous literature. These improve-
ments are robust to multivariate normality of the 
random errors (results for the panel ordered logit, 
provided in Table A2 in Appendix, do not change 
the conclusions of this section). 










 –.0027528**  –2.07
X
5,i,t
 –.0965688***  –3.00
X
6,i,t






















































 –.2306103***  –4.98
ΔX
7,i,t
 –.054128  –0.63
ΔX
8,i,t
 –.023608**  –2.40
ΔX
4,i,t
 –.0070837**  –2.03
Note: *** Refers to 1% significance, ** to 5% significance, * to 10% significance.
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5.1. Fiscal space
Table 1 clarifies the relevance of the fiscal space co-
variates. X
3
 (at 1%) and X
6
 (at 5%) are individually 
relevant, confirming H2 and H5. Both variables 
have the expected impact: a better government 
balance to GDP ratio decreases the probability of 
a worse rating; a greater weight of public debt in 
GDP increases that probability. Notwithstanding, 
both X
5
 and its associated cross-product dummies 
( )for 3S ′ ≥  are significant at 1%. The impact of 
an increase in the government revenue to GDP ra-
tio on the probability of a worse sovereign risk dif-
fers per rating class. The parallel lines assumption 
is not imposed. As such:
• for countries in the two best rating classes, the 
greater the government revenue to GDP, the 
lower the probability of a worse sovereign risk 
( )5ˆ 0.0965688 0 ;β = − <
• for countries in other rating classes, a greater 
X
5





ˆ ˆ 0.0830891 0,
ˆ ˆ 0.2404658 0,







Hence, validity of H3 is rating contingent. This re-
sult merits the attention of policy-makers. Firstly, 
fiscal consolidation on high risk countries should 
favor lower government spending instead of high-
er taxes. Secondly, the negative impact of higher 
taxes worsens as sovereign risk increases. 
5.2. External imbalances
Both the external debt to GDP ratio and the as-
sociated cross-product dummies for 4S ′ ≥  are 
significant (at 5%). Conclusions with respect to H4 
are rating contingent, since the parallel lines hy-
pothesis fails. Our results imply that:
• for countries in the 3 best rating classes, a 
decrease in X
4 
augments the probability of a 
worse credit rating 
( )4ˆ 0.0027528 0 ;β = − <
for countries in the other rating classes, a greater 
X
4




ˆ ˆ 0.0013048 0,





With respect to the current account balance to 







 (both at 1%) needs to be considered. 
As such: 
• for countries in the first four rating classes, 
an increase in X
10
 augments the probability of 
worsening sovereign risk 
( )10ˆ 0.1553171 0 ;β = >
• for a country in the rating class 5,S ′ =  an in-
crease in X
10
 diminishes the probability of a 
greater sovereign risk 
( )10 5.10ˆ ˆ 0.0752932 0 .β δ+ = − <
In conclusion, H11 is confirmed. With respect to 
changes in the current account to GDP ratio, ΔX
10
 
is found to be significant at 10%, with an estimat-
ed negative coefficient. Research hypothesis H12 
is confirmed. 
A final comment should be made on the results of 
this subsection. Macroeconomic theory supports 
the seemingly puzzling results for some estimated 
coefficient signs. Eliasson (2002) argues that external 
imbalances could serve as an indicator for the will-
ingness of foreigners to cover the current account 
gap through loans and foreign investment. Hence, 
a higher current account deficit would be associat-
ed with higher creditworthiness or good economic 
prospects, consequently, a higher sovereign rating. 
5.3. Risk and contagion
Table 1 confirms that X
8
 is significant (at 1%), and 
that its estimated coefficient is positive. A higher 
global risk increases the probability of a coun-
try moving to a worse rating class. With respect 
to risk aversion (ΔX
8
), we conclude in favor of its 
significance at 5%, but with a negative estimated 
coefficient. Thus, although agents react adversely 
to risk, they ask for smaller increases in the risk 
11
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premia. We estimate that a higher change in risk 
aversion lowers the probability of moving to a 
worse rating. This is consistent with the decline in 
risk aversion over the sample period, referred to 
in section 4, when discussion the behavioral basis 
for this variable (and in footnote 11). Furthermore, 
H8 and H9 are confirmed.
Table 1 corroborates H14. The regional dummy 
for the EA periphery is significant at 5%, and 
14 1.715823 0.β ′ = >  The probability of an EA 
periphery country experiencing a deterioration 
in credit worthiness is higher than for other ad-
vanced economies in our sample. This common ef-
fect is interpreted as shift contagion.
5.4. Economic activity space
Research hypothesis H1 is confirmed: X
2
 is signifi-
cant at 1%, and its estimated coefficient is negative. 
An increase in the real growth rate of GDP dimin-
ishes the probability of a worse sovereign risk.
Table 1 shows that a higher inflation rate 
augments the probability of a worse rating. 
7
ˆ 0.2205815 0.β = >  X
7
 is statistically signifi-
cant (at 1%), confirming H6. There is no support 
for claims regarding the relevance of changes in in-
flation. ΔX
7
 is not significant (at 10%), rejecting H7. 
Table 1 indicates that the estimated coefficient of 
the unemployment rate is positive and significant 
at 1%. A country with a higher unemployment rate 
has a higher probability of moving to the worse 
rating class. H10 is confirmed.
5.5. Year-specific dummies
Year-specific indicators are included in our 
model to account for episodes in the sample pe-
riod, not controlled for by other variables. Table 
1 reveals that indicators matching 2010, 2011, 
2012 and 2013 are significant, with positive esti-
mated coefficients. Research hypothesis H13 is 
confirmed.
The indicators’ estimated coefficients are in-
creasing from 2010 to 2012 and decrease in 
2013. This is compatible with the evolution of 
the EA crisis: the 1st rescue package for Greece 
occurred early in 2010; 2011 witnessed the Irish 
and Portuguese bail-outs, as well as the inver-
sion in Italy’s yield curve; in early 2012, Greece’s 
2nd rescue package was implemented, and the EU 
bailed-out the Spanish banking system. From 
2013 onwards, the crisis seems to have been 
softened, most likely due to regulatory changes 
and to a more pro-active ECB policy in favor of 
financial stability (De Santis, 2016).
CONCLUSION
This paper improved on the econometric methods used in the literature on the macro-financial founda-
tions of sovereign risk. A congruent model, including covariates for all dimensions suggested by earlier 
authors, was achieved. The panel ordered probit, without the parallel lines assumption, using SCDSs 
implied ratings as the sovereign risk proxy, clarified the puzzles in earlier empirical papers. Thus, SCDSs 
implied ratings match economic expectations based on fundamentals, showing no evidence (at a quar-
terly frequency) of credit risk mispricing. 
In particular, we have shown that a higher real growth rate of GDP decreases sovereign risk (improving 
on, e.g., Beirne & Fratzchser, 2013), a lower public debt to GDP ratio decreases sovereign risk (contrary 
to, e.g., Afonso et al., 2015), a higher government budget surplus benefits ratings (improving on, inter 
alia, Yuan & Pongsiri, 2015), and that lower inflation and unemployment rates diminish sovereign risk 
(improving on Kriz et al., 2015) and on Aizenman et al. (2013). Relaxing the parallel lines assumption 
allowed us to conclude that a worsening of the ratios of the external debt or the current account to GDP 
only deteriorate ratings for countries in high risk classes. Such risk class-contingent conclusions had not 
been addressed in the previous literature. Similarly, we improve on Kriz et al. (2015) by concluding the 
role of the ratio of government revenue to GDP is also varying with a country’s rating group.  Moreover, 
we have shown the relevance of controlling for risk aversion and global risk simultaneously, a procedure 
no other paper had followed before in this literature. 
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Policy implications of these results were carefully outlined. We plan to develop this research by assess-
ing the impact on ratings of filtered spreads. We also intend to consider other forms of contagion in our 
analysis, namely volatility contagion. 
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APPENDIX
Table A1. Confidence Intervals for iα
Lower 95% Upper 95%
Cut 1 –2,370774 3,291392
Cut 2 2,014583 7,855181
Cut 3 8,927898 14,33164
Cut 4 14,9639 19,03504
Cut 5 19,98533 26,03503
Cut 6 26,73192 33,00836
Cut 7 26,3271 34,0424
Table A2. Estimation results: panel ordered logit
Variable Coefficient T-ratio
X
2,i,t
 –.2404042*** –4.34
X
3,i,t
.0168277** 2.1
X
4,i,t
–.0058903** –2.55
X
5,i,t
–.1616363*** –2.91
X
6,i,t
–.2201923*** –3.92
X
7,i,t
.4043985*** 4.4
X
8,i,t
.1009374*** 3.98
X
9,i,t
.3044485*** 4.09
X
10,i,t
.3245383*** 3.75
D
GIPSI
3.002686*** 2.28
D
10,i,t
1.860224*** 4.52
D
11,i,t
3.351913*** 7.34
D
12,i,t
3.239343*** 7.10
D
13,i,t
.9443354** 2.09
Drat
4
X
4,i,t
.0085343** 2.57
Drat
5
X
4,i,t
.0097293*** 5.03
Drat
3
X
5,i,t
.3270163*** 8.99
Drat
4
X
5,i,t
.6128336*** 7.78
Drat
5
X
5,i,t
.8501224*** 9.60
Drat
5
X
10i,t
–.4498397*** –5.33
ΔX
7,i,t
–.1163345 –0.76
ΔX
8,i,t
–.0409116** –2.28
ΔX
4,i,t
–.00116338** –1.89
